cycles suggest that the major changes may have occurred even earlier, based on the underlying dynamics of public opinion, and the way that parties have or have not responded to these tides, with Labour moved to capture the center-ground of British politics, thereby becoming the least-worse choice of middle England, while the Liberal Democrats shifted towards the left, and the Conservatives remained with clear blue water on the far right.
The first part of this introduction highlights and summarizes the major features of the election results -with each topic covered in greater depth in subsequent chapters -including the striking impact of the British electoral system, the main reasons for the plummeting turnout, and the significant changes in party fortunes. Subsequent sections discuss alternative theories explaining the outcome, and the conclusion considers the implications for the future of British party politics.
[ Figure 1 about here]
A Popular Mandate?
As first glance, the day after the election, the front-page pictures of the Sunday-best Blair family outside of No 10 and headlines trumpeting Labour predominance at Westminster suggest a groundswell of public support and a renewed mandate for an overwhelmingly popular government at a time of widespread peace and prosperity. But closer examination shows that Labour's success rested on a more fragile popular mandate.
The Electoral System
First, Labour's landslide of seats was based on 40.7 percent of the UK vote, which was slightly lower that the share of the vote won in successive elections by Mrs. Thatcher and John Major (see Figure   1 ). It was the workings of the electoral system that generated Labour's parliamentary success. The British system of first-past-the-post generally produces a manufactured 'winner's bonus', exaggerating the proportion of seats won by the party in first place compared with their proportion of votes. For proponents of plurality elections, this bias is a virtue since it can guarantee a decisive outcome at Westminster, and a workable parliamentary majority, even in a close contest in the electorate 1 . One simple way to capture the size of the 'winner's bonus' produced by the electoral system is to divide the proportion of votes into the proportion of seats. A ratio of 1:1 would suggest no bias at all. But as Figure 2 shows, the bias in the 'winner's bonus' has fluctuated but also gradually risen since the 1950s. In this election, the winner's bonus was the highest ever recorded in the postwar era. This phenomenon is the product of three factors:
the geographical spread of party support, the effects of anti-Conservative tactical voting, and disparities in the size of constituency electorates. The Conservatives remain the one party that is most firmly opposed to any reform of first-past-the-post for Westminster, yet ironically they, more than Labour, might well benefit from such a development.
[ Figure 2 about here]
Even more disheartening for the Conservatives, like rolling a Sisyphean bolder up a hill, given the current electoral system, any subsequent reversal in Tory fortunes almost certainly requires more than one more heave. Depriving Labour of their overall majority in the next election needs a uniform national swing towards the Conservatives of at least 6.5% (see Table 1 ). A swing of 9% means that the Conservatives become the largest party. But winning the next election requires a Lab-Con swing of 10 .5% for the Conservatives to have an overall majority of one, a Herculean task twice the size of any swing experienced by the Conservatives in the post-war era. Drawing even in votes with Labour simply won't do the trick; if both major parties got 36.2% of the vote in the next election, for example, Labour would still have 151 more seats and a comfortable majority. The bias of the electoral system is such that the Conservatives need a 13% vote lead over Labour to form the next government.
[ Table 1 about here]
Turnout
Moreover, turnout plummeted, from 71.5% to 59.4%, the lowest since the khaki election of 1918 (see Figure 3 ). Four out of ten voters stayed home so that any electoral mandate was grudging and tepid, vitiating the sense that the public had given the government a fresh popular mandate and that Labour has won the electorate's 'hearts and minds' for the reform of public services, for entry of Britain into the euro, or for other aspects of the Blair project. Voting tumbled most sharply in safe Labour seats -places like Liverpool Wavertree, Stockport, Bootle -while falling far less in marginal Conservative seats such as Norfolk North and Hexham, where parties had greater motivation to mobilize support and voters had more incentive to feel that casting a ballot could make a difference to the outcome. Attempts to boost participation by devices such as easier access to postal ballots failed to reverse the tide. The most plausible reason for the fall in turnout was less a dramatic crisis of British democracy, as some popular commentators suggested, nor even widespread public cynicism, nor even a uniform cross-national trend, but rather the more prosaic fact that the Labour victory had been predicted in the polls and popular commentary for so long that few people felt that participating could make much difference to the outcome. [ Figure 3 about here]
Labour's victory was also tempered and caution because, at least on the more impressionistic basis of the campaign polls, the overwhelming public mood suggested a prevalent sense of tepid ennui, a potent mix of disaffection and impatience. Rather than displaying an enthusiastic endorsement of the Labour party, the public seemed resigned to giving the government another chance to get it right this time and to fix basic public services like schools, hospitals and trains. While Blair attracted lukewarm support, there was unwilling to forgive the Conservatives for their 18-year rule, fractious squabbling, unpopular policies and ineffective leadership. The pervasive sentiment, perfectly encapsulated in Sharon Storrer's televised harangue of Tony Blair about health services, was that Labour had been given a massive parliamentary majority in 1997, which the government squandered by over-caution and lack of courage.
There was strong criticism from the center-left that Labour had adopted Conservative limits on public spending during their first two years, when the public preferred better services, even at the cost of some tax increases. Sensing this mood, the mantra of Labour's campaign became roll-up-the-sleeves delivery, delivery, delivery on schools and hospitals, hospitals and schools. Blair's speeches emphasized how much had to be done before the railways ran on time, the NHS had more nurses and doctors, and schools more teachers and higher standards. Even after the Blair family re-entered No 10, there was a sense of post-electoral trieste rather than of flag-waving heady enthusiasm.
[ Table 2 and 3 about here] Nevertheless the outcome remains a solid victory for Blair (see Table 2 
Explaining the Labour Landslide

The Election Campaign
Did the campaign matter? There are many reasons why it certainly could potentially have made an important difference to the outcome. Theories of dealignment suggest that today the British electorate has become far more detached from their partisan and social roots 4 . If tribal loyalties have withered, this suggests that many voters have become more willing to switch party based on the appeal of particular issues and leaders, the messages and images communicated via the mass media, and short-term events occurring during the month-long campaign. The recent literature in political communications, which once stressed 'minimal effects', has similarly come to recognize that campaigns do have the potential capacity to matter both for civic engagement and for political persuasion 5 . These general assumptions also permeate accounts provided by many journalists and popular commentators who emphasize that the heart of the problem facing the Conservatives was bound up in the campaign, including the unpopularity of William Hague as a leader unable to connect with the British public, the strategy of using resolutely oldfashioned soap-box oratory and gut instincts in the days of professionalized political marketing, and the fact that the Tory campaign fought aggressively but on the wrong agenda, focusing on the euro, asylumseekers, tax cuts, and crime, while the public was more concerned about the state of schools and hospitals. The Conservative party machine showed evidence of organizational disarray at the grassroots, eroding activism, and reduced revenues, all of which meant that Smith Square was out-spun, outorganized and out-spent by Labour's Millbank machine. Conservative party membership has plummeted from an estimated 400,000 in 1997 to about 300,000 today. The Conservatives also faced an uphill task in getting their message across in this election because most of the press had turned against them and the opinion polls had predicted their wipeout for four years. In this perspective, the campaign was principally to blame for the defeat, but the Conservative party retains the capacity to spring back to life as impact on what the public learnt about the major issues during the election, as well as levels of party support 7 . But in practice given the strategies adopted by the parties and the news media this potential was never realized. There is a growing body of evidence that campaigns can make an important difference; whether they do is another matter.
Or the Economy, Stupid
Econometric models provide an alternative tack. In this view, elections are rarely won or lost in the space of a month-long campaign. Instead government popularity is a predictable function of the 'pocket-book' economy and how well most people feel that they have been doing in the run up to polling [ Table 4 about here]
Nor surprisingly the issue of macroeconomic performance (as distinct from levels of public spending and taxation) did not feature as a major concern among the public; in MORI polls published on 7 th June, when the public was asked about the most important problem facing the country, the economy was ranked 7 th , and unemployment 8 th , with inflation not even included in the top ten issues (see Table 4 ).
In the news media's agenda, as well, economic performance issues rarely played a prominent role. Echo
Research's content analysis of the press revealed that taxation and spending were heavily featured in the news, but unemployment was hardly mentioned at all. The analysis in this volume by David Sanders takes a closer look at this issue and the extent that the 'pocket book' economy influenced patterns of party support. But according to the standard view presented in economic theories of voting, at a time of widespread peace and prosperity, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for any Conservative leader, no matter how determined, charismatic and popular, to mount an effective challenge to the Labour government. In this sense, oppositions do not 'win' elections, but governments can certainly lose them.
The Impact of Social Dealignment
But by itself a strong economic performance, while facilitating a Labour victory, fails adequately to explain the scale of the Conservative defeat and their failure to advance in previous areas of the country where they were strong throughout the 1980s. One popular explanation lies in theories of social dealignment -that Labour was able to reach beyond its core base to maximize support from all sectors of society. Catch all parties appeal beyond particular areas of the country or their class base to form an electoral coalition attracting widespread backing.
The geography of the vote, and in particular the closure of the North-South divide for Labour, was critical to the outcome. Closer analysis revealed that vote gains for the Conservatives were wastefully distributed, so that in most of their target seats the Conservatives fell back rather than advancing. By appealing to their hard-core base of elderly true believers in the English countryside, the Conservatives failed to attract many waverers by an anti-euro, pro-tax cut platform. The Tory vote rose by 2.6% in Conservative-held seats, but by only 0.17% in Labour-held seats, and it actually fell (by -0.15%) in Liberal
Democrat-held constituencies. The North-South divide can be summarized most simply by measuring the proportion of votes that Labour and the Conservatives each get from the South and the North (see Table   5 ). Since 1992 Labour has strengthened support in the South, as they have gathered votes outside of their city bastions like Liverpool, Glasgow and Newcastle. In 2001, Labour got almost 6 million votes in the South and almost 5 million in the North. In contrast, the Conservatives remain confined to middleEngland: they won almost 6 million votes in the South but only 2.4 million in the North (see Figure 5 ).
[ Figure 5 and Tables 5 about here Table   7 ). The middle-class professionals and managers split 44:37 in favour of the Conservatives, but even
here there was only a narrow margin, and Labour won 50%+ of the vote in every other social class. It remains to be seen whether this pattern is confirmed in the subsequent data but the available evidence strongly suggests that class voting is withering away in British politics. As Evans suggested in the 1997 election 10 , the most plausible reason is Blair's strategy of straddling the center ground, promising improved public services but no rise in income tax, a safe pair of hands handling the economy but better heath and education. By this careful ideological balancing act, Labour has succeeded in creating a catchall party, losing some traditional support, but gaining substantially in middle England.
[ Tables 6 and 7 about here]
Parties can try to broaden their appeal through many different strategies including crafting specific policies designed to be popular with particular groups like pensioners or parents with young children, framing their campaign messages and images to make the party appear socially diverse, such as in their manifesto document, and selecting parliamentary candidates drawn from all sectors of society.
In this latter regard, Labour and the Liberal Democrats remain far more socially inclusive than the Conservative party. The social profile of the new parliament continues to remain, as ever, predominately white, male, and middle class. The 99 new members reflect the professionalization of the political class, drawn largely from backgrounds in local government and party staffers, as well as the usual sprinkling of lawyers, journalists and teachers. That being said, more ethnic minority candidates (64) stood for the major parties than ever before, although most faced hopeless contests (see Tables 8 and 9 ). As analyzed in detail later by Saggar, only a dozen Asian and black MPs were returned to Westminster, up three from 1997. Ethnic minority MPs now constitute 1.8% of the House of Commons, compared with about 6% of the population. In general, Asian and black candidates in all three major parties did slightly less well in vote swings than the national average, suggesting that they may face an additional electoral hurdle, although this may also be attributable to the type of seat they fought. As discussed further by Lovenduski, 373 women candidates stood for the major parties and 115 were elected, representing a slight fall on 1997. Seven Labour women MPs departed and only four new women MPs entered the House, producing a net loss of three. The swing in the vote experienced by women candidates in the major parties was similar to the national average. The stalemate in women's progress is due to the fact that few seats changed hands in the election, combined with the abandonment of the use of all-women shortlists in Labour's target seats, after a legal challenge. Recognizing this problem, the Labour manifesto and the Queen's speech for the new parliament have promised to amend the Sex Discrimination Act to allow each party to use positive strategies to increase the representation of women in future. In addition, women MPs have been gaining in experience, seniority and reputation; seven entered Cabinet, the highest proportion ever, including heading heavy weight spending ministries. 'Blair's babes', these women are not. The selection of candidates from every walk of life can only help to make parliament more socially representative but in this regard, as in many others, the Conservative party needs to reexamine its selection process so that it widens its appeal to all sectors of the electorate, rather than picking the typical public-school, Oxbridge-educated men who fail to connect with the concerns of the ordinary public.
[ Tables 8 and 9 about here]
Party Competition and the Public Mood?
Yet as ever answers to one question raise more puzzles. In particular, if Labour was able to take in the pound tax rise to pay for increased spending on education and social services. The results of the BBC /ICM election poll, which tested the popularity of the Liberal Democrat hypothecated tax proposal, found that the majority of the public (58%) expressed approval for the idea of tax rises with money spent on schools. And majority support was found across all social groups by gender, age and class, with about three-quarters of Liberal Democrat and Labour voters approving, along with even 41% of Conservatives (see Table 10 ).
[ The trends in Gallup polls during the last twenty years show that in 1979, when Mrs. Thatcher first came to power, about half the British public favored maintaining public services even at the expense of tax rises, while the remainder were fairly evenly divided between maintaining the status quo and enjoying tax cuts 13 . During the rest of Mrs. Thatcher's term of office, however, the proportion that preferred maintaining public services steadily rose, until the peak in 1995 when almost three-quarters opted for better public services even with tax rises. The policy mood appears to have reacted against the direction of government's policies, by demanding today that investment in education, health and welfare should be prioritized now over the pocket book economy. In the June 2001 general election, when the BBC/ICM poll repeated this question, only 4% of the British electorate (and only 6% of Conservative voters) favored tax cuts and less spending on health and education, while 56% preferred increased taxes and spending.
Moreover among the major parties, it has already been established that it was the Liberal Democrats who registered the most consistent rise in support during the campaign. If tax rises were once thought anathema to electoral popularity, it appears that the public mood has swung so far in Britain that this is no longer so. Yet the campaign run by both Conservative and Labour politicians, recalling the apparent popularity of Thatcherism in the 1980s, may be out of touch with the new zone of acquiescence.
What of the Labour proposals to bring private companies into the running of state schools and into the National Health Service? An expansion of private-public finance initiatives was announced in Labour press conferences and leadership speeches during the campaign, as a way to attract private investment while maintaining into public services free at the point of delivery, as well as being mentioned briefly in the manifesto. The Queen's speech has reiterated some of these ideas and although attracting considerable debate, and opposition from public sector unions, the way that this proposal is going to be implemented in schools and hospitals remain to be worked out. Nevertheless there is evidence in the BBC/ICM election poll that the initial response of the public has been extremely hostile towards these proposals. People were asked whether they approved of the idea that the government should or should not get private companies to run NHS hospitals and to run more state schools. The results in Table 10 show that the majority of the public opposed these policies, with the greatest opposition (65%) towards private companies running NHS hospitals. Disapproval was widespread throughout all sectors of the public, including in the case of health care, half of all Conservative voters and 80% of all Liberal Democrats. If the Blair government does go ahead with the proposals to expand private-public finance initiatives in schools and hospitals, for pragmatic reasons because this will raise public sector investment in the short term, it appears that Labour face an uphill battle in persuading the British public of the merits of this case, especially among their own supporters. There is convincing evidence that in the late 1970s and early 1980s nationalization was one of the main millstones hanging around Labour's neck, and subsequently ditched in the modernization process. Yet in the case of railways, at the time of the last election the BBC/ICM poll shows that, dispirited by broken down trains, fatal crashes and unreliable services, almost two-thirds of the public favours bringing the railways back into public ownership. Most remarkably, even a majority of Tories agree. At the same time we cannot assume that the public mood is fixed on these issues, anymore than it was fixed in the past, and if the government goes ahead with proposals for private-public partnership agreements, and if (and this is a big 'if') the health, education and transport services are seen to work better as a result of these initiatives, then by the time of the next election opinion may shift in its favor. But the size of the challenge facing the government should not be underestimated.
Conclusions
What are the implications of this analysis for the future of British party politics? The theory of policy moods and cycles suggests that where parties are sensitive to the public mood, once they perceive the switch in national sentiment, then they will eventually move in tandem on the policy agenda, to maintain popular support. But politicians may fail to recognize the signs of change in the public mood, for a variety of possible reasons; Conservatives may have reasoned that public opinion polls are often unreliable, so it is better to trust gut instincts that scientific mumbo-jumbo. In interpreting the public mood, politicians may follow many different cues such as communications with activists, conversations with local constituents, and debates in the news media, as much as more scientific techniques opinion polls and focus groups. After all Conservatives recall that Mrs. Thatcher had been returned to power throughout the 1980s on a platform of tax cuts, and it is not wholly irrational to assume that the public continue to support these initiatives, that they may simply lie by reporting socially-acceptable attitudes in surveys. Aging Tory party activists, in particular, as true believers, may act as an anchor dragging ideological revisions, particularly if parties are failing to attract new blood at grassroots levels. By picking other like-minded souls as Tory candidates, the parliamentary party may drift rightwards, even if the public mood moves center-left. If the Conservative party proves unable to reinvent itself, unable to grasp that they have gradually moved out of step with the public's zone of acquiescence, then politicians face the sanction of (repeated) electoral defeat, like shock therapy. The link between public preferences and electoral outcomes inevitably remains crude and imperfect, since leftwing or rightwing parties may be returned to power on successive occasions for many reasons like the workings of the electoral system, even when the policy mood is moving against them. Nevertheless in the longer term any growing disjunction between public preferences and the actions of policymakers can be expected to produce an electoral response favouring others more in tune with the national mood.
The theory of policy moods and cycles provide important insights into the strategies adopted by both the Conservatives, and to a lesser extent the Labour party, even in the face of the survey evidence that the public zone of acquiescence has shifted to opt for higher public spending even if it means tax increases. More research is required to flesh this theory out fully, in particular, at elite-level we still need to understand why ambitious politicians, seeking office, so often fail to read the policy mood correctly, and how the mechanism of 'selective perception' and ideological blinkers lead policymakers to misinterpret public opinion 14 . But, if this account is true, it suggests that one major reason for the failure of the Conservatives in the last election is that there are broad cycles in the policy mood, with the public responding to changed circumstances and what government actually does to alter the balance between the public and private sectors. In particular, if in a series of steps parties tilt too far in the direction of either markets or the state, then given the complex trade-offs involved, public opinion can be expected gradually to shift the balance of policy preferences back towards the center ground. But until Conservatives perceive this shift, in a lagged process they may continue to follow what they believe to be public preferences, even though in fact the policy mood may have changed. Despite their massive landslide of seats, or indeed because of it, Labour may fall into a similar trap by promising privatization of public services. The apathetic landslide does not mean that the public was persuaded of many core aspects of Labour's platform; merely that they mistrusted the Tories more because they were even further away from the contemporary national sentiment, stranded unreconstructed in their glory days of the 1980s, uncomprehending that the tide has rapidly flowed past them, becoming as unfashionable as power shoulder-pads, Jane Fonda's legwarmers, and Geeko's 'greed is good'. In many ways this theory does help to explain what has happened in the tide of public opinion in Britain in recent decades, and the way that the Conservatives, and so some extent Labour too, have lagged behind the national sentiment.
The British public spoke in the last election: it remains to be seen how far politicians listened and learnt the right lessons. 
